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M
igratory pressure is heavy around the globe and
the available data does not indicate any decrease
in the foreseeable future. It has always been there:
the highest number of immigrants to have come to Canada
in  one  single year  is  still that of  1913, with  more than
400,000. Today, globalization has only increased inde-
pendent intercontinental migration. Fast and cheap trans-
portation is available, as is international communication,
through telephone and internet; knowledge about host
countries is circulating through television and videos; large
communities exist in host countries and are able to help
friends, family, and compatriots.
The increase in global migrations also results from the
fact that the differences in peace and prosperity have been
sharpened between North and South in the past decades.
Many societies in the South have become poorer and mess-
ier: some people need to escape increasing violence; others
seek better survival opportunities for themselves and their
children. The increase in these “push factors” is a negative
dimension of globalization.
In most host countries, the protection and promotion of
rights and freedoms have been reinforced. Constitutional,
regional, and international standards are more sophisti-
cated, and implementation mechanisms are more effective.
We now know that the interaction of political struggle and
legal jurisprudence is key to effectively protecting human
rights: the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-
American Commission, the UN committees, the consti-
tutional case law in, say, Canada, Germany, and South
Africa testify that there is also a globalization phenome-
non in the field of human rights. In host countries, this
case law will often protect the foreigner and declare that
she is equal to the citizen on most issues regarding fun-
damental rights.
But our States nowadays often feel dispossessed in a field
that has been at the basis of their legitimacy for the past
decades: redistribution of wealth and social justice. This
goal is challenged by yet another aspect of globalization:
essentially free-trade policies and the pressure that eco-
nomic actors exercise to lower the cost of production. Our
States have tried to regain political ground by insisting on
their traditional mission since the Renaissance: security. In
the past twenty years, a phenomenon of “securization” of
the public sphere has emerged and resulted in the definition
of new fields of government activity: food security, environ-
mental security, bio-security, transport security, industrial
security, internal security, migration security, to name only
a few.
States have re-emphasized the role of the border as the
traditional and tangible symbol of their power. This is not
a new phenomenon. The border has always been used to
distinguish between “us” and “them.” For example, in the
aftermath of World War I, the Canadian government re-
sponded to the arrival of impoverished and displaced Euro-
peans by tightening the laws and stationing immigration
officials at ports in Europe to prevent further “undesir-
ables” from setting sail.
Following the sharp increase in asylum claims in the
mid-1980s, States have launched a huge co-operative effort
aimed  at  controlling migration flows, and in particular
reducing irregular flows. This effort targeted especially asy-
lum seekers, because, as these could count on human rights
standards and mechanisms to argue against refoulement,
host States knew there was a good chance that they would
not be able to remove them from the territory.
This co-operation was particularly productive in
Europe, as the abolition of the control of persons at internal
borders of the common European territory created a com-

plete restructuring of all government agencies that used to
work at the border (police, customs, health, transport,
immigration, etc.). The Schengen process emerged from
this and, following the Amsterdam and Nice treaties, the
European Commission is now in a position to take the lead
on immigration and asylum issues.
The arsenal of measures devised by Northern States to
prevent irregular migrants from setting foot on their terri-
tories is impressive. Their precise articulation is often con-
fidential as the whole field pertains to national security. The
intergovernmental framework in which this co-operation
operates ensures that it is sealed from democratic scrutiny.
This co-operation includes the following measures: im-
position of visas for all refugee-producing countries, carrier
sanctions, “short stop operations,” training of airport or
border police personnel, lists of “safe third countries,” lists
of “safe countries of origin,” readmission agreements with
neighbouring countries forming a “buffer zone,” regional
migration agreements, economic co-operation agreements,
common databases on individual files, immigration intel-
ligence sharing, police co-operation and interventions,
criminalization of migrant smuggling, reinforced border
controls, systematic detention, armed interventions on the
high seas, military intervention, etc.
All these measures are aimed at preventing, directly (by
a physical barrier) or indirectly (through deterrence), ir-
regular migrants from arriving at the border, by stopping
them somewhere on the way. In doing so, potential host
States believe they can (and, until now, have successfully
been able to) avoid triggering the control mechanisms that
we have established to protect our rights and freedoms:
parliamentary debates, court challenges, media scrutiny,
international shaming, etc. Very often, the actual stopping
of the migrant will  be carried out by a third party: an
employee of a private company, a foreign civil servant, etc.
Very often, it will be carried out in a country where mi-
grants’ rights issues do not call for intense scrutiny.
In the public discourse, our governments do little to give
the asylum seeker or the refugee a good image. On the
contrary, they emphasize the negative aspects of irregular
migration and play into the racism that makes many in
Northern societies eager for an excuse for shutting the door
on newcomers of colour. In effect, governments have suc-
ceeded in changing public opinion towards the refugee.
Irregular migrations are now considered part of interna-
tional organized crime and asylum seekers are not really
distinguished. The events of 11 September 2001 have pro-
vided the opportunity for besmirching their reputation
even further. The refugee was a very sympathetic character
in the years that followed the Indochinese exodus. She is
now regarded with suspicion. Is she bogus? Is she a criminal
or a terrorist? If we can’t know for sure, we now think that
we are better to protect ourselves at the expense of the
refugee. The benefit of the doubt has suddenly become a
dangerous concept.
Let’s give one example of the “grey zone” in which States
have been operating recently. Migrant smuggling has saved
many lives throughout history. Thanks to smugglers,
countless people escaped Nazi Germany, Franco’s Spain,
Vichy France, Central Europe during the Cold War, Viet-
nam in the 1970s, Guatemala in the 1980s, and many other
abusive regimes. The repression of migrant smuggling as it
is intended to function today would not have allowed them
to find protection elsewhere. In Canada, in a most recent
legislative change, the smuggling of ten persons or more,
without harm to  persons or property, can now carry a
penalty of life imprisonment: it is more than rape at gun-
point (fourteen years maximum), it is the equivalent of a
crime against humanity such as genocide. Such an absurd
disproportion in the scale of penalties shows how deep the
fear of the much fantasized barbaric invasion is embedded
in our collective mind, despite the fact that, individually,
we are ready to recognize that, if we were in the shoes of
many refugees, we too would use migrant smuggling to
escape and protect our children from violence. This state of
affairs comes partly from the fact that governments have
wilfully blurred the distinction between migrant smuggling
and trafficking in persons, but also results from the fact that
most of the fight against migrant smuggling takes place
abroad, far from the centres of interest of the majority of
the population.
Legally or not, migrations will increase, because inequi-
ties are not being reduced on our planet. How much vio-
lence will we allow our States to exercise against asylum
seekers in order to protect the part of collective wealth that
we have appropriated for ourselves and thanks to which we
have forged such instruments as democracy, human rights,
and the Rule of Law? Without advocating in favour of the
suppression of borders and the abolition of territorial sov-
ereignty, can we imagine ways to regulate migration flows
– perhaps through meaningful development policies – that
go beyond blind repression and recognize individual hu-
man dignity? How can we combine answering migration
needs and protecting human rights?
Refugees, by definition, are orphans in a system based on
the States’ responsibility to protect the rights of those on
their territory: their own State is unable or unwilling to take
up that responsibility. They need to seek the protection of
another State, but while in transit seeking that protection,
they fall into a gaping crack in the human rights system.
States have creatively (abusively) exploited this crack
through their interception measures, as we see in the fol-
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lowing papers, which go a long way towards explaining how
badly our societies are coping with irregular migration
flows. The challenge is immense and the principle of human
rights for all everywhere seems to be the only conceptual
framework that would make sense in order to “guard the
guardian.”
Andrew Brouwer and Judith Kumin give us a very clear
picture of how interdiction mechanisms are deployed,
starting with four case studies to which we might feel drawn
back constantly in order to test our assumptions. They note
how international law standards and principles (extraterri-
toriality, maritime law, responsibility, non-discrimination,
non-refoulement, right to seek asylum, mobility rights,
rights of the child and of the family, etc.) could be used to
limit blind State repression of irregular migration flows.
They then analyze the most recent UNHCR Executive
Committee Conclusion no. 97 (LIV) 2003 on Protection
Safeguards in Interception Measures and suggest how the
future UNHCR guidelines on interception could expand on
the acquis of the conclusion.
Areti Sianni exposes the complex web of measures and
institutions that are being developed at the level of the
European Union and notes the imbalance between deter-
rence and protection, the former prevailing largely over the
latter. She indicates that there is some interest in creating a
common set of “protected entry procedures,” but deplores
that the EU directive on carrier sanctions included only the
“weakest of safeguards,” although some airline companies
have tried to fight back in courts. The externalization of
immigration controls through the EU network of Member
States’ immigration liaison officers is also challenged in at
least one national court. The international co-operation on
migration issues is very active, either with many countries
that form part of the buffer zone around Europe (including
Albania, Morocco, Turkey, Ukraine, Yugoslavia), or coun-
tries of origin (including China, Russia, Iran), or even with
regional institutions (such as Mercosur or the Andean
Community).
As could be expected, considering the notoriety of the
Tampa incident and of its consequences, several articles are
dedicated, at least in part, to Australian immigration poli-
cies. Richard Wazana (to be published, for reasons of space,
in the next issue of Refuge) offers an analysis that situates
the treatment  of refugees in  contemporary Australia  in
direct line with the former “White Australia policy.” He
draws upon Lévi-Strauss’s distinction between the bricoleur
and the engineer to place the asylum seeker in the first
category, alongside the Aboriginals and the Asian migrants
of yesterday. He develops the four tropes that are “operat-
ing in Australia’s media, political parties and popular cul-
ture, around refugees, border protection, generosity and
Australian culture”: the belief that White and Anglo-Saxon
Australian culture is under a constant and growing threat;
the belief that Australia, as a nation under attack, has the
right to control its borders; the belief that those seeking
asylum in Australia are not refugees but are people seeking
a better life, and that even if they are refugees, they are
queue jumpers; the belief that Australia is generous as a
recipient of refugees, thus justifying its actions of deterring
the smuggling of refugees.
Jessica Howard gives us a very precise account of the
Tampa incident and the policy implications of the “Pacific
Solution.” In line with the “whole of government ap-
proach,” the sequence of the boarding and return of a
“Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel” (SIEV) is detailed. The role
of the Australian military and police and of IOM, chosen as
lead agency over UNHCR, in the regional co-operation
model with Indonesia are underlined. The Australian pol-
icy of “disruption” of people smuggling in Indonesia is
analyzed and Howard delineates its consequences, includ-
ing, possibly, the drowning of 353 asylum seekers (mostly
women and children) with the sinking of the SIEV X (for
which Australia has refused to acknowledge any responsi-
bility). In conclusion, it is hoped that Australian policies
will not prove too attractive a model for Europe or North
America and that one will not witness the emergence of an
“Atlantic Solution” or a “European Solution.”
Jessica C. Morris compares the policies of the two coun-
tries that have successfully practiced interdiction policies
on the high seas on a large scale: Australia and the U.S. She
notes that interdiction is in stark contrast to the “deterrito-
rialization” that the universal human rights doctrine had
operated and emphasizes the “the lacuna between the
physical spaces in which states exercise jurisdictional con-
trol and the spaces in which they will  assume  juridical
responsibility.” She underlines that “implicit to this ‘teleol-
ogy of restriction’ is the assumption that many asylum
seekers’ claims are not well founded” and that, in line with
a “self-diagnosed territorial vulnerability,” “the goal of re-
asserting sovereignty clearly supersedes international re-
sponsibilities in this regard.” This renewed emphasis placed
on the distinction between the inside and the outside is only
limited by internal factors, and especially constitutional
provisions protecting human rights: the lack of a Bill of
Rights in Australia and the role of executive orders in the
U.S. have allowed these countries to shield their policies
from judicial scrutiny. She warns against any underestima-
tion of the forces behind restrictionist immigration con-
trols (the doctrine of plenary power at the borders is not yet
a “constitutional  fossil”) and asserts that the dominant
interpretation by receiving States of their obligation to
refugees is the “‘ex gratia’ approach, implying whatever
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protection is provided results purely from humanitarian
goodwill.”
Wendy Young and Bill Frelick offer diametrically op-
posed views on one potential response to U.S. interdiction
of Haitians. Young argues in favour of an in-country or a
regional-processing approach, with co-operation between
the NGO community and American authorities. Frelick
argues against such an approach, underlining that  past
experience has shown that in-country processing is used as
a fig leaf for interdiction practices that violate the non-re-
foulement principle. He draws attention to the impossibly
dangerous predicament facing those invited to ask for asy-
lum while still in the country where they are persecuted.
Unfortunately, the sum total of these articles does not
leave the reader with much hope of a replacement solution
for interdiction in the short term. Until such time as human
rights clearly prevail over any action taken by governments
or in their name by private actors, inside or outside of their
territory, for security purposes or otherwise, we are going
to witness interdiction policies and practices that put refu-
gees at risk, in the name of the protection of the comfort
and well-being of the citizens of the North. We must debate
them and, where possible, contest them.
The developments in containment policies highlight a
challenge for NGOs who, at least in the case of refugee
organizations, tend to be territorially based, paying most
attention to refugees who reach their territory. Where gov-
ernments have engaged in formal collaboration, NGOs
have followed suit and developed strong cross-border ties,
for example,  the European  NGOs responding to policy
developments in the EU, or Canadian and U.S. NGOs in
response to the “safe third country agreement” of 2002.
However, where the collaboration is informal between gov-
ernments, the NGOs have not been so effective. In the case
of interdicted refugees, it is not clear that NGOs have
organized themselves to make the connections.
This failure does not go unnoticed by the governments
and this is surely part of the attractiveness of interdiction as
the central measure to deal with refugee flows. As long as
the refugees are offshore, i.e. nameless, faceless, and voice-
less, there is little chance of refugees asserting legal rights or
winning advocates among the local population. And when
a refugee is effectively sent back to persecution, NGOs have
not been good at ensuring a follow-up and publicizing their
stories.
Unless a human face is given to these returnees,’ their
plight doesn’t seem real and urgent, not even to the refugee
advocates, let alone the general public. NGOs and other
advocates have options open to them for providing this
human face or for influencing authorities in adopting miti-
gating policies. All come at a cost and choices will have to
be made, but strategies can be developed for effective action
targeting public opinion and political elites, domestic insti-
tutions, and international organizations.
Some have been presented at a special meeting of the
Canadian Council for Refugees in May 2003: direct action;
presence at airports; developing research agendas; reinforc-
ing inter-NGO co-operation, as well as co-operation be-
tween governments and NGOs; strategic and co-operative
use of legal challenges; public education regarding security
and refugee protection; making use of journalism and me-
dia (sharing stories of human rights abuses and interdiction
stories); tracing the lives of refugees who have been inter-
dicted.1
Some policy options may also be explored with govern-
ments (one of them is discussed in the present issue):
protected visas; increased access to regular migration; in-
creased access to refugee protection in country of origin;
debating the role of privatization (carriers and detention
centres).
No political gain has ever been obtained without a strug-
gle. In the end, it is left to our imagination and energies to
make sure that these strategies are explored and made to
bear fruit.
Note
1. See online: <http://www.web.ca/~ccr/interdictionproceed-
ings.PDF>.
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